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Abstract:	 This	paper	explores	how	a	perceived	 tax	burden	 is	 influenced	by	 the	degree	
that	 neighbors	 prefer	 income	 redistribution.	 Further,	 this	 paper	 investigates	 how	 the	
influence	of	neighbors	 is	affected	by	the	degree	of	 interaction	between	neighbors.	For	
these	purposes,	individual-level	data	and	place	of	residence	data	were	combined.	After	
controlling	 for	 individual	 characteristics,	 I	 obtained	 the	 following	 key	 findings:	 people	
are	more	likely	to	perceive	the	amount	of	tax	as	low	when	neighbors	are	more	likely	to	
support	redistribution	policies.	Further,	this	neighbor	effect	increases	when	community	
participation	rates	are	high.	This	tendency	is	clearly	observed	in	high-income	groups	but	
not	in	low-income	groups.	This	implies	that	the	norm	for	redistribution	leads	rich	people	
to	consider	the	tax	burden	as	low.	Further,	the	effect	of	the	norm	increases	when	there	
is	a	greater	accumulation	of	social	capital	within	a	residential	area.		
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1 Introduction
A critical issue for policy-makers is how to deter tax evasion. Income
redistribution through tax collection increases the welfare of the poor, while
decreasing that of the wealthy. In the case of progressive tax, the wealthy are
more liable to pay tax that finances public spending. Inevitably, the wealthy
have a greater incentive to evade tax than the poor, reducing public spend-
ing.1 As a consequence, the size of the underground economy increases,
resulting in a reduction of tax revenue. If tax evasion prevails, people con-
sider it is unreasonable to pay tax. In this case, people perceive the tax bur-
den to be too high to pay. However, assuming an interdependence of utility
functions between rich and poor (Pauly, 1973), the wealthy have a motiva-
tion to pay tax. Poor people possibly commit a robbery and rich people are
likely to be its victims. Such negative externality caused by poor is thought
to influence the utility of rich people. In this case, interdependence of utility
holds true even if people seek self-interest. The interdependence of utility
functions is more common at the local level since closeness between rich
and poor enhances interaction between them. For instance, within the same
residential area, rich people are more likely to be interested in the circum-
stances of poorer people when the geographical and social distance between
rich and poor people is small. Therefore, an individual’s willingness to pay
tax is, in part, influenced by social values such as social norms and relation
with others.
The aim of this paper is to assess the effect of norms on the perceptions
of rich people on tax and how the interactions between norms and social
capital influence those perceptions. This paper attempts to compare the ef-
fect of the norm for redistribution on the tax burden between poor and rich
groups using Japanese General Social Surveys (JGSS), which includes more
than 10,000 observations.2
I found that people are more inclined to perceive tax as low in areas
where residents are more likely to prefer redistribution policies. The ef-
fect of residents is greater when neighbors are actively involved in com-
munity activities. These tendencies were observed only for people from
high-income groups and not for people in low-income groups. The cost and
benefit from public goods is examined by looking at citizens: “a preference
for public spending increases to be funded from additional taxes for which
they were not liable. Consistently, there is evidence of greater demand for
1 In contrast, indirect taxation such as consumption tax gives poor people the motivation
to evade tax because their income is not high enough to pay such tax.
2 Tax base components include individual income and corporate income. Furthermore,
the components of Japan’s total revenue are almost equally distributed among indi-
vidual income tax, corporate income tax, and indirect tax (Doi and Ihori, 2009, 135).
In 2010, the rate of individual income tax income was 31.6% in Japan, and 37.3% in
Sweden (source: website of Ministry of Finance Japan accessed on August 29, 2014.
http://www.mof.go.jp/taxpolicy/summary/condition/016.htm).
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public spending if this is financed out of taxes paid by others” (Gemmell et
al. 2003, 811). Therefore, the poor, who are less likely to be liable for tax pay-
ments, support increases in public spending via tax burdens on the wealthy.
From this we can derive an inference that rich people perceive a greater tax
burden if they act in their own self-interest. In addition to self-interest, the
role played by social values is considered to be a key factor in the realiza-
tion of a welfare state and enhancing redistributive policy (e.g., Gordon,
1989; Luttmer, 2001; Klor and Shayo, 2010).3 Preference for redistribution
can be analyzed from the viewpoint of fairness (e.g., Galasso, 2003; Alesina
and Angeletos, 2005; Tyran and Sausgruber, 2006; Rainer and Siedler, 2008;
Luttens and Valfort, 2011). Altruism can give rich people an incentive to
redistribute their wealth to poorer people (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Fong,
2001).4This seems to reduce the perceived tax burden for rich people.5 In
this case, rich people do not perceive tax as high even when they are liable
for progressive tax. Norms possibly lead people to behave altruistically
even when they are actually selfish (Becker, 1996).6 A number of work-
places took into account the role of norms to analyze individuals’ behavior
concerning tax (e.g., Alm et al. 1999; Wenzel, 2004; 2005 a; 2005b; Balestrino,
2010; Cullis et al. 2012). It seems plausible that the norm for redistribution is
formed within a community when community members prefer income re-
distribution. On the assumption that the psychological cost to deviate from
’proper behavior’ or ’proper perception’ is sufficiently high, the norm for
redistribution leads rich people to perceive their tax burden as low even if
individuals’ act in their own self-interest.7 In addition to that norm, it has
been recently found that people are likely to prefer redistribution policies
in areas where social capital is sufficiently accumulated through frequent
contact among neighbors (Yamamura, 2012). This suggests that an exter-
3 Trust, a key social value, is observed to be important when tax systems are considered.
Generalized trust leads people to pay tax (Scholz and Lubell, 1998). Furthermore, trust in
institutions such as government, the legal system, public officials and politics is thought
to be important to establish tax morale and deter tax evasion (Scholz and Pinney, 1995;
Torgler, 2003; Hammar et al. 2009), and such trust induces people to prefer the welfare
state (Algan et al. 2012). Hence, the size of the welfare state is determined in part by
social trust (Bergh and Bjørnskov, 2011).
4 Social values and social norms are associated with quality of institutions. For instance,
trust is observed to determine the quality of institutions, which in turn affects GDP per
capita (Bjørnskov and Me´on, 2013). Thus, there is interplay between social norms and
the enforcement of laws (Acemoglu and Jackson, 2014).
5 Social values are also important when the consequences of redistribution are considered.
For instance, a redistributive policy’s effectiveness seems to depend on religion (Chang,
2010) and culture (Luttmer and Singhal, 2011).
6 The interdependence of utility functions between the rich and poor possibly exists not
only when rich people are benevolent but also when they are egoistic.
7 People who do not follow the norm are frowned upon and denounced by members who
share the norm, reducing the level of utility. Even if there is not such a direct reaction,
the violators are unlikely to enjoy any benefit (social support) from other members. Such
negative externalities cause violators to incur psychological costs.
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nality via neighboring poor people increases social pressure on rich people,
which leads rich people to prefer redistribution.8 However, the degree of
such an externality and social pressure seems to depend on the norm. As-
suming that neighbors do not prefer redistribution, rich people are unlikely
to be an object of envy even if there are close interpersonal relations be-
tween neighbors. There is another possibility that neighbors’ preferences
for redistribution are less likely to result in a psychological cost for rich peo-
ple if community members do not have contact with each other. If these
hold true, the relation between the norm for redistribution and community
participation is considered to be complementary. From this I infer that the
effect of the norm regarding perceptions about tax seems to depend on so-
cial capital, which is regarded as the strength of personal networks within
a community (Putnam, 2000).9 However, previous research ascertaining the
determinants of perceptions about tax did not consider the effect of norms
and social capital (Cuccia and Carnes, 2001; Gemmel et al. 2003, 2004; Feld
and Larsen, 2012). The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2, the testable hypotheses are presented. Section 3 provides an ex-
planation regarding data and the empirical method used. Section 4 presents
the estimation results and their interpretation. The final section offers some
conclusions.
2 Hypotheses
According to Becker (1996), norms are defined as “those common values
of a group which influence an individual’s behavior through being inter-
nalized as preferences” (Becker, 1996, 225). Norms play an important role
in deterring opportunistic behavior such as tax evasion.10 The reason is that
“if a person does not free-ride at the expense of others when that is advan-
tageous to him, it may be because norms against the behavior lower the
utility from the free-riding” (Becker, 1996, 225). Social interaction is defined
in terms of a consumption externality or as the utility function of a person to
include the reactions of others in his/her actions (Becker, 1974). Social inter-
action induces people to obey the norm. That is, “the enforcement of norms
typically depends on negative reactions by peers toward individuals who
8 An individual’s life satisfaction is influenced by the characteristics of their neighbors
(Shields et al. 2008). Neighbors with higher education levels enhance university partici-
pation for middle class students, resulting in human capital accumulation (Foley, 2012).
9 Social capital influences not only individuals’ perceptions but also their productivity. For
instance, social capital and neighbors’ characteristics are found to be key determinants
regarding the earnings of microfinance borrowers (Gomez and Santor, 2001).
10 Based on an analysis of questionnaire responses from Italy and the United Kingdom,
Cullis et al. (2012) found that social norms frame the decision to pay tax. The degree of
tax evasion depends on the probability that the tax evader will be caught and penalized.
The perception of tax evasion, such as the ease to evade tax, possibly affects the perceived
tax burden.
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deviate from ’proper’ behavior” (Becker, 1996, 229).11 Take an example of
punishment for violating a norm, those who act against the norm suffer so-
cial ostracism. That is, there is a psychological cost to violating a norm that
defines ’proper behavior’.12 The influence of a norm on individuals’ util-
ity differs according to the income group the individuals belong to (Becker,
1996). Income tax is progressive in Japan and so the rate of tax for rich peo-
ple is higher than poor people. That is, for rich people, the benefit of public
goods is more likely to be smaller than their tax burden. However, rich peo-
ple can be sufficiently compensated for any reduction in utility when they
pay tax because of the incorporation of the norm for redistribution in their
preferences.13 Therefore, even for rich people, a tax burden is considered
relatively low when there is a norm that people should support redistribu-
tion. Accordingly, I advance
Hypothesis 1: The norm for redistribution leads rich people to perceive the tax
burden as low. The effect of the norm seems to depend on the degree of so-
cial interaction. Further, the more people integrated into social relations, the
greater the influence of the social interaction. This is because various ben-
efits come from these relationships rather than market transactions. Once
people are excluded from a strong relationship (such as interpersonal net-
work formed in community), they lose the long-term benefit of the network
(Hayami, 2001). Rich people therefore agree to obey the norm in return for
a sufficiently large long-term benefit from the community network. Fre-
quency of contact with neighbors is considered as a type of social capital
(Putnam, 2000) and seems to reflect the degree of integration into the social
relation. Hence, the cost to violate the norm is greater for residents in areas
with a greater accumulation of social capital. In other words, peer ’pressure’
lowers rich people’s marginal disutility to absorb the norm and therefore to
pay progressive tax. This leads me to propose
Hypothesis 2: The effect of the norm for redistribution on the perceptions of rich
11 An experimental analysis found that the “minority of fair-minded players can force a big
majority of selfish players to cooperate fully in the public goods game with punishment”
(Fehr and Schmidt, 1999, 856).
12 It is also important to take into account the proportion of transfer recipients in society
when we analyze the degree of welfare society. The norm to deter tax evasion depends
on the proportion of taxpayers and transfer recipients. As derived from a theoretical
analysis, “a low-tax society supported by a majority of taxpayers or a high-tax society
supported by a majority of transfer recipients... Given a low proportion of transfer re-
cipients, the disutility of living on the work of others is high. On the other hand, a high
proportion of transfer recipients will be associated with a low level of disutility” (Lind-
beck et al. 1999, 30).
13 It should be noted that the cost and benefit of paying tax for rich people depends on the
taxation system. Basically, poor people are considered transfer recipients. However, the
proportion of transfer recipients also varies according to the tax system. For instance,
consumption tax is indirect and so poor people are also taxpayers. Poor people have an
incentive to evade tax because their income is not enough to pay tax.
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people is greater when they live in an area where residents are more likely to interact
with each other.
Perceived tax burden is linked to the benefit from public spending fi-
nanced by taxes. According to the benefit principle of taxation, taxation
may be applied on the basis of correspondence between the tax effort re-
quired and the benefit obtained by public goods and services. Hence, we
postulate:
Hypothesis 3 If the benefit of public goods and services is sufficiently large,
people perceive the tax burden as low even when the tax burden is high.
3 Data and Methods
3.1 Data
In this paper, I used JGSS data, which are individual-level data.14 In JGSS
surveys, a two-stage stratified sampling method is used. The surveys have
been conducted in Japan since 2000. In this paper, the dataset covered 2000,
2001, 2002, 2003, 2005, 2006, and 2008.15 JGSS was designed as a Japanese
counterpart to the General Social Survey (GSS) from the United States. To
this end, JGSS asks standard questions regarding individuals’ characteris-
tics via face-to-face interviews. The data includes information about per-
ceived income tax burden, opinions regarding income redistribution poli-
cies, marital and demographic (age and gender) status, annual household
income,16 years of schooling, prefecture of residence, and prefecture of res-
idence at 15 years old. A Japanese prefecture is the equivalent to a state in
the United States or a province in Canada. There are 47 prefectures in Japan,
and the average values for the variables included in the JGSS can be calcu-
lated for each prefecture. These average values reflect the characteristics
of each prefecture. Data were collected from 22,796 adults, aged between
20 and 89 years. Respondents did not answer all of the survey questions;
therefore, data regarding some variables are not available, and the number
of samples used in the regression estimations is reduced to 7,794.
14 Data for this secondary analysis, “Japanese General Social Surveys (JGSS), Ichiro Tan-
ioka,” was provided by the Social Science Japan Data Archive, Information Center for
Social Science Research on Japan, Institute of Social Science, the University of Tokyo.
15 Surveys were not conducted in 2004 and 2007. Surveys were conducted in 2009 and 2010
but the data is not available.
16 In the original dataset, annual earnings were grouped into 19 categories, and it was as-
sumed that everyone in each category earned the midpoint value. For the top category
of “23 million yen and above,” I assumed that everybody earned 23 million yen. Of the
7,794 observations used in the regression estimations, there were only 98 observations in
this category. Therefore, the problem of top-coding should not be an issue here.
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Figure 1: Distribution of Views Regarding Perceived Tax Burden
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Note: Respondents were asked: “Do you think the amount of income tax you have to pay is high?”. There were
five response options: “1 (too low)”, “2 (somewhat low)”, “3 (about right)” “4 (somewhat high)”, “5 (too high)”.The
number indicated in the figure is equivalent to the number of responses.
In comparison with international data, the use of JGSS data in this paper
has the advantage that “within country analysis is much less likely to be
subject to measurement error due to changes in institutional structures of
redistributive policies” (Alesina and Giuliano, 2009, 22). The variables used
in the regression estimations are shown in Table 1, which provides defini-
tions, means, standard deviations, maximum values, and minimum values.
The distribution of TAX is shown in Figure 1; it shows that most people
considered tax as “somewhat high” or “too high”.
The key dependent variable is TAX (index of the perceived income tax
burden). The JGSS asked the following question: “Do you think the amount
of income tax you have to pay is high?” There were five response options:
“1 (too low)”, “2 (somewhat low)”, “3 (about right)” “4 (somewhat high)”,
and “5 (too high)”. TAX is the response options chosen by the respondents.
The regional characteristics used in this paper are SC, NORM, and AVIN-
COM. As stated in Table 1, SC is the average value of agreeing with re-
distribution policies within a prefecture. NORM is rate of those who ac-
tively participate in community events within a prefecture. PSPEND is the
rate of public spending per GDP within an area. UNDER is the scale of
the underground economy. AVINCOM is the average household income
within a prefecture. The utility of people is considered to be influenced not
only by one’s own income but also by the income level of neighbors (e.g.,
Clark and Oswald, 1996; Neumark and Postlewaite, 1998; McBride, 2001;
Stutzer, 2004). In other words, not only absolute income but also relative
income is considered related to an individual’s utility and, therefore, per-
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ceptions. This paper controls for both individual-level household income
and average household income within residential prefectures to capture the
relative income effect. For this purpose, in addition to respondents’ house-
hold incomes, the income level of residential areas are taken into account.
I used JGSS data to calculate the average household income within a pre-
fecture (AVINCOM). With respect to individual characteristics, INCOME,
AGE, MARRY, SCHOOL, UNEMP, MALE, PROG 2, PROG 3, PROG 4 and
PROG 5 are used. Data for these variables can be obtained from the JGSS.
The proxy for individuals’ political ideology is constructed, based on re-
sponses to the JGSS question, “Where would you place your political views
on a five-point scale?” There are five response options: “1 (conservative)”
to “5 (progressive)”. The placement of political views is captured by dum-
mies: PROG 5 takes the value of 1 when the response is “5”, otherwise 0.
PROG 1, PROG 2, PROG 3, and PROG 4 are defined in a similar manner.
3.2 Definitions of Social Norm and Social Capital
Previous research has distinguished personal norms and social norms
and scrutinized their effects when perceptions and attitudes regarding tax
were analyzed (Wenzel, 2004; 2005a). However, in these studies social norms
were measured in terms of individual perceptions regarding the social norm,
based on the following questions: “Do MOST PEOPLE think they should
honestly declare cash earnings on their tax return?” and “Do MOST PEO-
PLE think working for cash-in-hand payments without paying tax is a triv-
ial offence?” (Wenzel, 2004, 220). This index is considered as a subjective
evaluation rather than objective one. Hence, this measure of social norms is
regarded as an endogenous variable. Endogeneity bias seems to occur when
tax perception is a dependent variable and the measure of social norms is in-
cluded as an independent variable. To avoid this problem, in this paper, the
social norm is measured as the average rate of those who prefer redistribu-
tion policies within the area that the respondent resides. The JGSS included
a question concerning preferences for redistribution: “It is the responsibil-
ity of the government to reduce the differences in income between families
with high incomes and those with low incomes.” There were five response
options, ranging from “1 (strongly disagree)” to “5 (strongly agree)”. In this
paper, the average value of the responses within a residential prefecture is
defined as the norm for redistribution shared by neighbors. In this research,
and in line with Putnam (2000), the degree of participation in community
activities is defined as social capital.17 The influence of neighbors is consid-
ered to be greater when people participate in community activities. That
17 Social capital is defined as the features of a social organization such as networks and
norms, as well as social trust facilitating coordination and cooperation (Putnam, 2000).
Hence, social capital can be interpreted in various ways, thereby causing ambiguity
and criticism regarding its measurement and definition (e.g., Paldam, 2000; Sobel, 2002;
Durlauf 2002; Bjørnskov, 2006).
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Figure 2: Distribution of Household Income
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Note: One unit is equal to one million yen.
is, the effect of the norm on the perception of individuals is greater when
they live in areas with higher levels of community involvement. In 1996,
the Japan Broadcasting Corporation conducted a survey on the conscious-
ness and behaviors of prefecture residents (Japan Broadcasting Corporation
1997). This survey included a question about the degree of community ac-
tivity involvement: “Do you actively participate in community activities?”
Respondents could choose one of three responses: “yes”, “unsure”, or “no”.
I calculated the rates for those who answered “yes” within a prefecture, and
used this value as a measure of social capital. I also assumed that the rate of
participation in community activities was stable over time. As mentioned
earlier, there are 47 prefectures, and I obtained a proxy for each prefecture.
In this paper, as an objective category, high-income earners are defined
as those with a household income higher than 6 million yen. The remainder
of the residents are defined as low-income earners. However, as demon-
strated in Figure 2, the shape of distribution of household income is not
clearly divided at 6 million yen. Inevitably, this category is arbitrarily de-
termined. To put it differently, those who belong to the 5 million yen group
can also be considered as high-income earners although the category of this
paper defined them as low-income earners. It is difficult to clearly divide re-
spondents into two groups because “middle-income earners” can be consid-
ered to belong not only to the high-income group but also to the low-income
group. To reduce any ambiguity regarding categorization, and following
Derin-Gu¨re and Uler (2010), an alternative category of income groups is
suggested. The JGSS asked: “Compared with Japanese families in general,
what would you say about your family income?” There were five response
Copyright c© 2015 University of Perugia Electronic Press. All rights reserved 10
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Figure 3: Distribution of Subjective Income Position
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Table 2: Comparison of TAX, NORM, and SC between High-income Household Group
and Low-income Household group
 
 High-income Low-income t-statistics 
TAX 4.25 4.20 2.63*** 
NORM 3.69 3.71 14.2*** 
SC 0.46 0.47 10.7*** 
Note: Respondents whose annual household income is higher than 6 million yen are classified as the high-income
group. Respondents whose annual household income (or equivalent to) lower than 6 million yen are classified
as the low-income group. All observations were used. Absolute values of t-statistics are the results of a mean
difference test between high- and low-income household groups. *** indicates significance at the 1% level.
options: “Far below average”, “Below average”, “Average”, “Above aver-
age” and “Far above average”.
Figure 3 demonstrates that the share of the “average” group is greatest
and that there is now a clearer difference between high- and low-income
groups than in Figure 2. In addition to the objective category, an alterna-
tive subjective category is made based on the responses to the question. In
the subjective category, those who belong to the high-(low)income group are
defined as those who considered themselves above (below) or far above (be-
low) average income earners. In the alternative measure, those responded
“average” are excluded from the sample.
Table 2 shows the comparison of key variables between high-income and
low- income groups, which is based on the objective category. TAX for the
high-income group is 0.05 points higher than that of the low-income group.
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Further, it is statistically different at the 1 percent level. This implies that,
in comparison with people with low-income, people with high-income per-
ceive income tax as higher. Values for NORM and SC for the high-income
group are lower than the low-income group and statistically significant at
the 1 percent level. This can be interpreted as stating that people belong-
ing to the high-income group are less likely to live in areas where neighbors
prefer income redistribution and actively participate in community events.
The higher TAX is, the lower NORM and SC are. All in all, Table 2 suggests
that NORM and SC are negative associated with TAX.
3.3 Econometric Framework and Estimation Strategy
In Figures 4(a), 4(b), and 4(c), the vertical axis shows the average TAX
within a prefecture. The horizontal line shows NORM in each prefecture.
Figure 4(a) shows the relationship between TAX and NORM, based on the
whole sample. The relationship for the low-income group is demonstrated
in Figure 4(b), while the relationship for the high-income group is shown in
Figure 4(c). A cursory examination of Figure 4(a) shows that TAX is not ob-
viously associated with NORM. For the low-income group, as in Figure 4(b),
TAX is positively associated with NORM. In contrast, for the high-income
group, as shown in Figure 4(c), TAX is negatively associated with NORM.
This is consistent with Hypothesis 1. However, this relationship is observed
when other factors are not controlled for. Hence, a more precise examination
of the relationship is required via regression analysis using individual-level
data matched with characteristics from residential areas. For the purpose of
examining the hypotheses previously proposed, the estimated function of
the baseline model takes the following form:
TAXim = α0 + α1NORMm ∗ SCm + α2NORMm + α3SCm + α4PSPENDm
+ α5UNDERm + α6AV INCOMm + α7INCOMim + α8AGEim
+ α9MARRYim + α10SCHOOLim + α11UNEMPim + α12MALEim
+ α13PROG 2im + α14PROG 3im + α15PROG 4im + α16PROG 5im + uim
where TAXim represents the dependent variable in individual i and pre-
fecture m. Regression parameters are represented by α. As explained ear-
lier, values for TAXim range from 1 (too low) to 5 (too high). In this case,
a multinomial response is an ordered response. Hence, the ordered pro-
bit model is appropriate to conduct the estimations (Greene 2008, 831-835).
The error term is represented by uim. It is reasonable to assume that the
observations may be spatially correlated within a prefecture, as the prefer-
ence of one agent may well relate to the preference of another in the same
prefecture. To consider such spatial correlation in line with this assump-
tion, I calculated z-statistics using robust standard errors. The advantage of
this approach is that the magnitude of the spatial correlation can be unique
to each prefecture. In addition to spatial correlation, heteroscedasticity is
thought to exist due to differences in individual income. To correct any
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Figure 4(a): Relationship between the Norm for Redistribution and Perceived Tax
Burden for All Categories of Income Level
!
Figure 4(b): Relationship between the Norm for Redistribution and Perceived Tax
Burden for Low-income Level Group (Annual Household Income is Lower than 6
Million Yen)
!
Figure 4(c): Relationship between the Norm for Redistribution and Perceived Tax
Burden for High-income Level Group (Annual Household Income is Higher than 6
Million Yen)
!
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bias caused by heteroscedasticity, a multiplicative regression is used in this
paper (Greene 2008, 169-172). Based on this model, individual income is
used to control for heteroscedasticity; spatial correlation is also considered
by robust standard errors clustered by prefecture. As explained earlier, in
prior research, social norms have been measured looking at individuals’
evaluations of social situations (Wenzel, 2004; 2005a). There seems to be
reverse causality that individual’s perceived tax burden influences his/her
preference for redistribution policies. Therefore, endogeneity bias can oc-
cur. The rate of support for redistribution policies within a residential area
can be considered as a macro-level variable. Hence, individual’s perceived
tax burden is unlikely to have a direct effect on residential area level sup-
port for redistribution policies. This is similar to the case that individual
income level does not change GDP. Thus, NORM is thought to be exoge-
nously determined. On this assumption, to alleviate this bias, the rate of
those who support redistribution policies is used as a social norm in this
paper.18 From Hypothesis 1, NORM is anticipated to take the negative sign
when a sample of rich people is used. Furthermore, it seems plausible that
people who are content with life and economic conditions are more likely
to have contact with their neighbors. If this holds true, those who are con-
tent and perceive tax as low are more inclined to have contact with neigh-
bors. Hence, the causality between socialization and the perceived tax bur-
den is ambiguous. To alleviate this bias, in this paper, I examine the effect
of social capital formed in residential areas rather than an individual’s so-
cialization. From Hypothesis 2, NORM*SC is predicted to take the negative
sign. The scale of the underground economy in Japan has been estimated
(Kadokura, 2002) as the ratio of products in Japan’s underground economy
to GDP (%).19 This is available in each prefecture for 1998, which is before
the first JGSS (Kadokura, 2002). Hence, in this paper, the ratio of products
in Japan’s underground economy in 1998 is used as a predetermined vari-
able. UNDER is incorporated to capture the degree of tax evasion because
tax evasion is positively associated with the scale of underground economy.
If tax evasion is rampant, people consider the psychological cost of tax eva-
sion to be low because they are less likely to be detected. Therefore, people
perceive the tax burden as low. From Hypothesis 3, PSPEND is predicted
to be negative because a high public spending rate indicates that the ben-
efit obtained by public goods and services is sufficiently high. AVINCOM
is included to control for relative income within a prefecture. As suggested
by Luttmer (2005), increases in average income within a locality lead to re-
ductions in residents’ welfare. Accordingly, people feel unhappier when
the average income increases. People are thought to perceive tax as high.
18 Even if effect of individual level perceived tax burden on the area level preference for
redistribution is not sizable, a little effect seems to exist. It should be noted that the
possibility of endogenous bias.
19 This is fitted values estimated by using available social and economic variables.
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In this paper, for poor people, AVINCOM is expected to take the positive
sign. However, an increase in AVINCOM appears to lead people to expect
that they can earn more. If this is so, the sign for AVINCOM becomes nega-
tive. Following previous research concerning redistribution (e.g., Ravallian
and Lokshin, 2000; Corneo and Gru¨ner, 2002; Ohtake and Tomioka, 2004;
Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005; Rainer and Seidler, 2008; Alesina and Giu-
liano, 2009; Yamamura, 2012), INCOME, AGE, MARRY, SCHOOL, UNEMP
and MALE are incorporated as independent variables to control for individ-
ual characteristics. Political ideology plausibly influences preferences for
redistribution. It is important to control for this ideology when preferences
for income redistribution are estimated (Bernasconi, 2006; Alesina and Giu-
liano, 2009). Hence, perceptions about tax burdens seem to be influenced
by political ideology. This is captured by PROG 2 -PROG 5 with PROG 1
(conservative view), as reference groups.
4 Estimation Results
Tables 3(a), (b), 4(a), and (b) present the estimation results of the ordered
probit model. All control variables reported in Tables 3(a) and (b) are also
included in Tables 4(a) and (b). However, the results of the control variables
are not reported in Tables 4(a) and (b) because their results are similar to
those in Tables 3(a) and (b). The results of the baseline model, which does
not include the interaction term between NORM and SC, are reported in Ta-
bles 3(a) and (b). Tables 4(a) and (b) show the results when the interaction
term between NORM and SC is included. In each table, the estimation re-
sults, based on a sample containing rich and poor respondents, are shown
in columns (1) and (4) of Tables 3(a) and 4(a). For the purpose of comparing
factors determining TAX between high-income and low-income groups, the
sample is divided into high-income and low-income groups. The results for
the high-income group are presented in columns (2) and (5) of Tables 3(a)
and 4(a) and in columns (1) and (3) of Tables 3(b) and 4(b). The results for
the low-income group are presented in columns (3) and (6) of Tables 3(a)
and 4(a) and in columns (2) and (4) of Tables 3(b) and 4(b). As pointed
out by Luttmer (2005), there is “the possibility that cross-section results are
driven by selection of people who are happier by nature into areas that are
relatively pooraˆOne might worry that movers may have had something un-
observed happen to them” (Luttmer, 2005, 977). This unobserved factor can
cause estimation bias. The JGSS provided data regarding not only current
residential prefectures but also the residential prefectures of respondents
at 15 years of age. If the current residential prefecture is not the same as
the prefecture at 15 years old, respondents are considered to be “movers”.
To alleviate this bias, following Luttmer (2005) and Yamamura (2012), I con-
ducted estimations by excluding all respondents who had moved to a differ-
ent prefecture. Results using the ordered probit estimation are exhibited in
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columns (1)aˆ(3) of Tables 3(a) and 4(a), and in columns (1) and (2) in Tables
3(b) and 4(b). For a robustness check, estimation results based on multi-
plicative regressions are exhibited in columns (4)aˆ(6) of Tables 3(a) and 4(a),
and in columns (3) and (4) in Tables 3(b) and 4(b). I see from Table 3(a)
that the signs for NORM have the expected negative sign for results based
on the whole sample and the high-income group sample. Furthermore, as
presented in columns (2) and (5), it is statistically significant at the 1 per-
cent level for high-income group. In contrast, in columns (3) and (6), the
sign of NORM is positive although not statistically significant for the low-
income group. The coefficients exhibited in Table 3(a) cannot be interpreted
as marginal effects and it is difficult to interpret them in the ordered probit
model. Hence, to determine economic significance, I see a marginal effect
of NORM. The values for TAX range between 1 and 5 and so the marginal
effect of NORM varies according to values of TAX (Greene, 2008, 831-835).20
In the third line from bottom, Tables 3(a) show the marginal effect of NORM
on the probability that the value of TAX is 5 (perceive tax burden as being
“too high”).
In columns (2), the absolute values of the marginal effect of NORM are
0.37, respectively. Further, they are statistically significant at the 1 percent
level. This can be interpreted as a 1 percent increase in those who support
redistribution policies within a residential area leads to a 0.37 percent de-
crease in the probability that high-income people perceive their tax burden
as “too high”.21 These results are in line with Hypothesis 1. In Table 3(a),
PSPEND is negative and statistically significant in columns (1), (2), (4), and
(5). This is consistent with Hypothesis 3. In contrast, UNDER is negative
as expected but is not statistically significant. Concerning AVINCOM, the
higher their neighbors’ income, the less satisfied people become. If their
neighbors have high levels of income, then people perceive tax as high. In
contrast, poor people expect that they can earn more if their neighbors have
higher levels of income. Hence, people perceive the tax as low. The for-
mer effect is neutralized by the latter, and so AVINCOM is not statistically
significant for whole sample and the low-income group sample. For the
high-income group, AVINCOM has the negative sign and is statistically sig-
nificant at the 1 percent level. The reason seems to be that the latter effect
is distinctly greater than the former. As for individual characteristics re-
ported in Table 3(a), the sign for INCOME is positive for whole sample and
the high-income group sample, whereas it is negative for the low-income
group sample. With the exception of column (3), it is statistically significant.
20 The marginal effects of NORM can be calculated for each value of TAX; that is, the
marginal effect of NORM on the probability that TAX is 5, the marginal effect of NORM
on the probability that TAX is 4, the marginal effect of NORM on the probability that TAX
is 3, the marginal effect of NORM on the probability that TAX is 2, and the marginal effect
of NORM on the probability that TAX is 1.
21 There is possibility that endogenous bias exists. Hence, it should be noted that the
marginal effect of NORM suffered from the bias.
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Table 3(a): Baseline Model: Dependent Variable is TAX: Each Group is Categorized
Based on an Objective Measure (Annual Household Income)
 
 
 Ordered probit  Multiplicative model 
 (1) 
All 
(2) 
High-
income 
(3) 
Low-
income 
 (4) 
All 
(5) 
High-
income 
(6) 
Low-
income 
Regional characteristics 
NORM  –0.30 
(–1.46) 
 –0.96*** 
 (–3.20) 
 0.20 
 (0.78) 
 –0.24 
(–1.59) 
 –0.75*** 
(–3.24) 
0.16 
(0.84) 
PSPEND -0.01** 
(-2.35) 
-0.01** 
(-2.16) 
-0.01 
(-1.09) 
 -0.01** 
(-2.40) 
-0.01** 
(-2.21) 
-0.01 
(-1.11) 
UNDER -0.01 
(-0.51) 
-0.01 
(-0.31) 
-0.03 
(-0.68) 
 -0.01 
(-0.51) 
-0.01 
(-0.45) 
-0.02 
(-0.82) 
AVINCOM –0.06*** 
(–2.73) 
–0.14*** 
(–4.66) 
0.01 
(0.53) 
 –0.05*** 
(–2.94) 
–0.11*** 
(–4.43) 
0.01 
(0.46) 
Individual characteristics 
INCOME 0.01* 
(1.70) 
0.01*** 
(3.34) 
–0.02* 
(–1.68) 
 0.01** 
(2.10) 
0.01*** 
(3.39) 
–0.01 
(–0.81) 
AGE –0.003** 
(–2.55) 
0.0003 
(0.17) 
–0.006*** 
(–4.07) 
 –0.002** 
(–2.57) 
 0.0003 
(0.17) 
–0.004*** 
(–4.07) 
MARRY 0.06* 
(1.93) 
0.08 
(1.27) 
0.07* 
(1.87) 
 0.05** 
(1.97) 
0.05 
 (1.26) 
0.04 
(1.42) 
SCHOOL 
 
–0.02*** 
(–2.93) 
–0.005 
(–0.62) 
–0.02*** 
(–2.58) 
 –0.01** 
(–2.56) 
 –0.002 
(–0.30) 
–0.02** 
(–2.51) 
UNEMP 0.03 
(0.30) 
–0.22 
(–0.96) 
0.11 
(0.89) 
 0.02 
(0.23) 
–0.18 
(–0.92) 
0.09 
(1.04) 
MALE 0.01 
(0.33) 
–0.03 
(–0.78) 
0.04 
(1.05) 
 0.004 
(0.16) 
–0.03 
(–0.89) 
0.02 
(0.84) 
PROG_2 –0.01 
(–0.10) 
–0.01 
 (–0.09) 
0.01 
(0.10) 
 0.01 
(0.14) 
–0.01 
(–0.09) 
0.02 
(0.42) 
PROG_3 0.20*** 
(3.72) 
0.19** 
(2.16) 
0.22*** 
(3.33) 
 0.17*** 
(3.88) 
0.14** 
(2.24) 
0.19*** 
(3.74) 
PROG_4 0.18*** 
(2.67) 
0.17* 
(1.88) 
0.19** 
(2.25) 
 0.14*** 
(2.73) 
0.12* 
(1.84) 
0.17** 
(2.64) 
PROG_5 0.52*** 
 (4.88) 
0.74*** 
(4.12) 
0.39*** 
(3.16) 
  0.35*** 
  4.95) 
0.44*** 
(4.33) 
0.28*** 
(3.28) 
Marginal effect  
NORM 
–0.11 
(–1.46) 
–0.37*** 
(–3.21) 
0.08 
(0.78) 
    
Log likelihood -6283 -2730 -3526  -6967 2994 -3948 
Observations  5606  2479 3127   5606 2479 3127 
Note: Respondents whose annual household income is higher than 6 million yen are classified as the high-income
group. Respondents whose annual household income is lower than (or equivalent to) 6 million yen are classified
as the low-income group. Values in each variable are coefficients. Sample is limited to people living in the same
prefecture they lived in at 15 years of age. In the third line from the bottom, the marginal effect of NORM on the
probability that TAX is 5 is reported. Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics calculated using robust standard
errors clustered in the prefecture. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
In all estimations, year dummies are included as independent variables but are not reported because of space
limitations.
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Table 3(b): Dependent Variable is TAX: Each Group is Categorized Based on a Sub-
jective Measure
 
 Ordered probit  Multiplicative model 
 (1) 
High-income 
(2) 
Low-income 
 (3) 
High-income 
  (4) 
Low-income 
Regional 
characteristics 
     
NORM –1.25*** 
(–2.74) 
0.16 
(0.70) 
 –0.88*** 
(–2.72) 
0.16 
(0.84) 
PSPEND -0.01 
(-0.90) 
-0.004 
(-0.78) 
 -0.01 
(-0.99) 
-0.003 
(-0.66) 
UNDER -0.11 
(-1.46) 
0.01 
(0.57) 
 -0.08 
(-1.36) 
0.02 
(0.90) 
AVINCOM –0.15** 
(–2.29) 
–0.02 
(–0.64) 
 –0.11** 
(–2.35) 
–0.02 
(–0.67) 
Individual 
characteristics 
     
INCOME 0.02** 
(2.52) 
–0.01 
(–0.96) 
 0.02** 
(2.50) 
–0.01 
(–0.97) 
AGE  –0.001 
(–0.23) 
–0.002 
(–1.29) 
  –0.001 
(–0.28) 
–0.002 
(–1.56) 
MARRY 0.02 
(0.23) 
0.16*** 
(3.13) 
 0.01 
(0.22) 
0.13*** 
(3.06) 
SCHOOL 
 
–0.01 
(–0.28) 
–0.01 
(–1.27) 
 –0.004** 
(–0.32) 
–0.01 
(–1.17) 
UNEMP –0.08 
(–0.12) 
0.19 
(1.21) 
 –0.13 
(–0.24) 
0.13 
(1.27) 
MALE  0.05 
(0.61) 
–0.01 
(–0.14) 
 0.02 
(0.45) 
–0.01 
(–0.19) 
PROG_2 –0.03 
(–0.24) 
0.08 
(0.85) 
 –0.01 
(–0.08) 
0.09 
(1.09) 
PROG_3 0.17 
(1.27) 
0.31*** 
(3.62) 
 0.14 
(1.48) 
0.27*** 
(3.74) 
PROG_4 0.20 
(1.37) 
0.21** 
(2.31) 
 0.14 
(1.41) 
0.18** 
(2.31) 
PROG_5 0.25 
(0.98) 
0.56*** 
(4.03) 
 0.16 
(1.00) 
0.40*** 
(4.05) 
Marginal effect  
NORM 
–0.48*** 
(–2.74) 
0.06 
(0.70) 
   
Log likelihood -852 -2559  -931 -2956 
Observations 784 2280  784 2280 
Note: Respondents who considered themselves above or far above average income earners are classified as the
high-income group. Respondents who considered themselves below or far below average income earners are
classified as the low-income group. Respondents who considered themselves as average earners are included
in the estimations in columns (1) and (4) in Table 3(a), but excluded from the sample in Table 3(b). Values in
each variable are coefficients. Sample is limited to people living in the same prefecture they lived in at 15 years
of age. In the third line from the bottom, the marginal effect of NORM on the probability that TAX is 5 is reported.
Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics calculated using robust standard errors clustered in the prefecture. *, **,
and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. In all estimations, year dummies are
included as independent variables but are not reported because of space limitations.
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This is consistent with the assumption that high-income people are more
inclined to perceive the tax burden as high as income tax is progressive. A
significant negative sign for SCHOOL is observed in all estimations. It is
statistically significant for whole sample and the low-income group sam-
ple. People with higher education are more likely to expect higher future
earnings even if they are currently poor. The income tax burden for the
low-income group is smaller than the high-income group when income tax
is progressive. Hence, the results for SCHOOL can be interpreted as sug-
gesting that there is high probability that higher educated poor people will
become rich in the future, and therefore poor people will perceive the tax
burden as low. PROG3, PROG4 and PROG5 have the positive sign and are
statistically significant in all estimations. In my interpretation, these results
imply that more liberal people are less likely to trust the government and
so feel that tax is not effectively used. As a consequence, the tax burden is
perceived to be higher than the benefit from tax, leading liberal people to
perceive tax as high. However, the assumption that liberal people are less
likely to the trust government is open to discussion. A closer examination of
this assumption is beyond the scope of this paper and so should be explored
in future research. Regarding NORM, the results reported in Table 3(b) are
similar to those in Table 3(a). This leads me argue that those who consider
themselves as high-income earners are more likely to perceive their tax as
low if neighbors are more likely to prefer redistribution when the alterna-
tive subjective category regarding high-income people is used. Therefore,
Hypothesis 1 is strongly supported. In contrast, PSPEND continues to be
negative but is not statistically significant. Therefore, Hypothesis 3 is not
supported.
Turning now to Table 4 (a), I focus on NORM*SC, which is the key vari-
able to test Hypothesis 2 because the results of the other control variables
are similar to those exhibited in Table 3(a). As exhibited in columns (1),
(2), (4) and (5), NORM*SC yields the negative sign for all samples and the
high-income sample. Further, for the high-income sample, it is statistically
significant. In contrast, NORM*SC produces the positive sign for the low-
income sample although it is not statistically significant. That is, the effect
of NORM becomes greater when there is a greater accumulation of social
capital within a residential area through participation in community activ-
ities. The results of Table 4(b), based on an alternative category regarding
high- and low-income groups, are almost identical to those of Table 4(a).
Considering Tables 4(a) and (b) together leads me to assert that the effect of
NORM for rich people is strengthen by SC and so Hypothesis 2 is strongly
supported. To sum the various estimated results presented thus far, I con-
clude, as a whole, that the estimation results examined in this section are
consistent with Hypotheses 1 and 2, and hence support them reasonably
well. The above findings imply that the norm for redistribution within a
residential area leads rich people to agree with higher tax rates even if in-
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Table 4(a): Model Including Cross Term between NORM and SC: Dependent Variable
is TAX, each Group is Categorized Based on Objective Measure (Annual Household
Income)
 Ordered probit  Multiplicative model 
 (1) 
All 
(2) 
High-income 
(3) 
Low-income 
 (4)  
All 
(5) 
High-income 
  (6) 
Low-income 
Regional 
characteristics 
       
NORM*SC –0.59 
(–0.23) 
–6.32* 
(–1.81) 
2.32 
(0.62) 
 –0.88 
(–0.45) 
–4.69* 
(–1.83) 
1.05 
(0.36) 
NORM 0.01 
(0.01) 
2.35 
(1.24) 
–1.02 
(–0.49) 
 0.21 
(0.20) 
 1.73 
(1.25) 
–0.39 
(–0.25) 
SC 2.14 
(0.22) 
22.2* 
(1.74) 
–8.45 
(–0.60) 
 3.27 
(0.44) 
17.1* 
(1.75) 
–3.72 
(–0.34) 
Marginal effect  
NORM 
–0.10 
(–1.06) 
–0.25** 
(–1.80) 
0.04 
(0.30) 
    
Marginal effect  
SC 
-0.03 
(–0.22) 
–0.18 
(–0.76) 
0.08 
(0.43) 
    
Log likelihood -6283 -2729 3525  -6967 -2993 -3948 
Observations  5606   2479 3127  5606 2479 3127 
 
 Note: Respondents whose annual household income is higher than 6 million yen are classified as the high-income
group. Respondents whose annual household income is lower than (or equivalent to) 6 million yen are classified
as the low-income group. Values are coefficients in each variable. Sample is limited to people living in the same
prefecture they lived in at 15 years of age. In the third line from the bottom, the marginal effects of NORM and
SC on the probability that TAX is 5 are reported. Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics calculated using robust
standard errors clustered in the prefecture. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively. In all estimations, control variables used in Table 3(b) are included in the model but the results are
not reported because of space limitations.
come tax is progressive. Further, that effect of the norm is strengthened by
social capital formed by neighbors. According to the vicious-cycle hypoth-
esis, countries with greater income inequality demonstrate less support for
redistribution and greater acceptance of wage inequality than their more
equal counterparts (Alesina et al., 2001). For example, social capital has de-
clined in the United States (Putnam, 2000). This might be one reason why
the “vicious cycle” is observed in the United States. To the contrary, recent
research by Kerr (2014) found that a growth in inequality is met with greater
concern over inequality, greater support for government-led redistribution
to the poor, and greater support for more progressive taxation. This is con-
gruent with findings from the United States, where rich people are more
likely to increase charitable contributions for inequality reduction than poor
people (Derin-Gu¨re and Uler, 2010). Thus, based on Kerr (2014), a mecha-
nism appears to exist where growth in inequality forms the norm to prefer
redistribution, which in turn causes people to perceive tax as being low. It
would be worthwhile to empirically explore whether the mechanism does
indeed exist.
5 Conclusions
Income tax in Japan is progressive: the higher the income, the greater
the tax. That is, the net benefit from tax is smaller for the wealthy than the
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Table 4(b): Model Including Cross Term between NORM and SC. Dependent Variable
is TAX: Each Group is Categorized Based on Subjective Measure
 Ordered probit  Multiplicative model 
 (1) 
High-income 
(2) 
Low-income 
 (3) 
High-income 
  (4) 
Low-income 
Regional 
characteristics 
     
NORM*SC –11.3* 
(–1.70) 
0.85 
(0.25) 
 –8.98* 
(–1.77) 
-0.06 
(-0.02) 
NORM 5.00 
(1.39) 
–0.28 
(–0.15) 
  3.80 
 (1.46) 
 0.20 
 (0.13) 
SC 45.3* 
(1.72) 
–3.26 
(–0.25) 
 34.1* 
(1.79) 
0.31 
(0.03) 
Marginal effect  
NORM 
–0.25 
(–1.27) 
0.03 
(0.38) 
   
Marginal effect  
SC 
0.34 
(1.23) 
–0.09 
(–0.55) 
   
Log likelihood -851 -2559  -930 -2956 
Observations 784 2280  784 2280 
 
 
Note: Respondents who considered themselves above or far above average income earners are classified as the
high-income group. Respondents who considered themselves below or far below average income earners are
classified as the low-income group. Respondents who considered themselves as average earners are included
in the estimations of columns (1) and (4) in Table 3(a), but excluded from the sample in Table 3(b). Numbers
indicate marginal effect. Values are coefficients in each variable. Sample is limited to people living in the same
prefecture they lived in at 15 years of age. In the third line from the bottom, marginal effects of NORM and SC
on the probability that TAX is 5 are reported. Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics calculated using robust
standard errors clustered in the prefecture. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively. In all estimations, control variables used in Table 3 (b) are included in the model but its results are
not reported because of space limitations.
poor. It seems appropriate that the wealthy are likely to perceive the tax as
high if their perceptions about tax burdens are determined by self-interest.
In this paper, I suggest another possibility: the norm for redistribution leads
the wealthy to perceive their tax burden as low even if the individual is not
altruistic and acts in their own self-interest. However, to date no empirical
research has attempted to examine this possibility. This paper explores how
the perceived tax burden is influenced by the degree that neighbors prefer
income redistribution. Further, this paper investigates how the influence of
neighbors is affected by social capital measured as the degree of neighbors’
involvement in community activities; individual-level data and place of res-
idence data were combined to determine this effect. After controlling for in-
dividual characteristics, I obtained the following key findings: the norm for
redistribution leads rich people to consider the tax burden as low. Further,
the effect of the norm increases when there is a greater accumulation of so-
cial capital within a residential area. That is, one’s perceived burden of tax
is influenced by psychological externalities through interactions in the com-
munity. Existing research suggests that rich people are more likely to prefer
income redistribution in areas where there are higher rates of community
participation (Yamamura 2012). However, psychological externalities vary
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according to the type of norms within a community. That is, in the condition
that neighbors are unlikely to prefer redistribution, the psychological cost to
rich people to oppose redistribution is small. The findings of this paper im-
ply that the norm plays a central role in affecting perceptions regarding tax
burdens. The effects of the norm within a community decrease when re-
lationships within the community are weak, even though neighbors prefer
redistribution. This is in line with the argument in Baron (2010) that socio-
economic distance influences the degree of enforcement of altruistic moral
preferences. This paper used survey data and hence the cost of giving a re-
sponse is very low. Accordingly, survey responses can be considered as “ex-
pressive”. According to the expressing voter hypothesis, individuals vote
because they are expressing their opinions regarding particular issues, and
not because they expect to alter the outcomes of the election (e.g., Tullock,
1971; Copeland and Laband, 2002; Sobel and Wagner, 2004). The results of
this paper can be interpreted as suggesting that “pleasing others has a basis
in wishing to be liked or popular, which can be achieved by expressively
signaling conformity with group-defined norms” (Hillman, 2010, 404). It is
difficult to identify the reasons behind the results of this paper. Hence, ex-
perimental analysis should be conducted to determine whether the results
can be explain by expressive behavior or psychological externalities. In this
paper, public spending and the norm proxy are assumed to be exogenous
because they are prefecture-level variables rather than individual-level vari-
ables. However, there is a possibility of endogeneity bias in these variables,
and this is an issue to be addressed in future research. The effect of the
residential area characteristics seems to differ according to individual char-
acteristics. That is, even if individuals live in tight-knit communities with
high levels of social capital, their preferences are not necessarily influenced
their neighbors if they do not socialize in the neighborhood. A lack of data
prevents a more detailer exploration of this issue. In addition, Japan is gen-
erally characterized as a racially homogenous society. Japan’s historical and
cultural condition is different from Western countries. The influence of so-
cial capital is thought to depend on institutional strength (Ahlerup et al.
2009). Hence, when testing the generality of the findings provided in this
paper, it is necessary to examine the hypotheses proposed here using other
countries with different historical and cultural background.
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